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 As climate change continues to alter the physical world, transboundary sources of fresh 
water are experiencing increasing stress. Among the shared rivers of the world, the Indus river 
system of South Asia poses a unique security threat due to its role in the contentious India-
Pakistan relationship. The mix of population growth and climate change-related water stresses 
both states experience provide solid ground to pursue a renegotiation or updating of their shared 
1960 Indus Waters Treaty; but achieving such a diplomatic breakthrough remains elusive. Left 
unaddressed, the tensions connected to the Indus system raises the specter of a future Indo-Pak 
conflict catalyzing into a nuclear exchange that would devastate the region far beyond the 
borders of the principal actors themselves. In an effort to mitigate the risk of such a conflict, 
there is great value in investigating what possible conditions might produce a successful future 
negotiation over the Indus Waters Treaty. To begin identifying which conditions or provisions 
might be present in today’s Indo-Pak relationship (if any), this inquiry will attempt to answer the 
following research question: What baseline conditions are needed in the 21st century to facilitate 
a possible renegotiation or updating of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and 
Pakistan?  
 To answer this research question, I have applied discourse and content analysis 
techniques to a balanced sample of water-related policy documents from India and Pakistan that 
span the last twenty years; 20 documents per state. I conducted successive rounds of open and 
axial coding of these documents in accordance with a Grounded Theory approach to this 
qualitative study, yielding part of a theoretical framework for successful riparian negotiations. 
My findings indicate that several critical baseline conditions for success do indeed exist between 
 iii 
India and Pakistan. Both governments share an understanding of what fresh water means to each 
state, they employ similarly high-level officials to communicate water policy, and they are both 
acting from a position of rationality, in the neorealist sense of the word. While far from a 
complete solution, this illustration of specific areas of commonality between rival states should 
be cause for hope. Building on the ideas of this research would eventually lead to a greater 
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1. Introduction: Water as a Security Driver 
 
 Beyond the role water plays in sustaining our day-to-day lives, this precious resource also 
exerts significant influence on all levels of human society. When competing demands for fresh 
water inevitably arise between different sectors of society, security practitioners and government 
policymakers would be wise to remember that disputes over water are driven by local 
environmental realities that defy political or territorial borders. Quite often, this discrepancy 
between natural resources and human-selected territory contributes to strained relations among 
water-sharing or riparian states. While food and energy sources can vary, water is the only 
resource for which there is no substitute. Consequently, freshwater lakes, rivers, and aquifers 
shared by two or more states will necessarily cause these stakeholders to interact with one 
another. When they engage over a transboundary water source, these interactions can catalyze 
mutually beneficial acts of collaboration. But they can also lead to a zero-sum competition for 
the water in question. It is the sense of competition, the impression that one more liter for Them 
means one less liter for Us, that lends itself to water disputes. 
 There are many transboundary water sources around the world that illustrate the 
connection between water and security, each with unique hydropolitical variables to explore. The 
United States and Canada have their Great Lakes. South America’s most famous example is, of 
course, the Amazon. The Nile River is shared by multiple states in Africa, as is the Rhine River 
in Europe. But among these and other riparian relationships, the rivers of South Asian pose a 




1.1 South Asia’s Hydropolitical Environment 
 
 Among the security risks facing 21st century South Asia, the region’s freshwater profile 
deserves ongoing attention for two primary reasons. First, as previously mentioned, there is no 
substitute for fresh water. Second, one particular river system in South Asia, the Indus, is 
contentiously shared by long-time enemies India and Pakistan. As these states are connected by 
their shared waters, they have no choice but to interact; each time exposing the citizens of the 
entire region to the risk of an Indo-Pak conflict. Whenever that risk occurs, it invariably raises 
the specter of nuclear annihilation each successive interaction. Much like religious disagreements 
and historical grievances, water must be considered a security issue between India and Pakistan. 
Addressing the contentious use of the Indus river system is a crucial component of any attempt to 
forge a lasting peace between these riparian states.  
 The extensive body of traditional Indo-Pak security literature focuses on the risk of war, 
counterinsurgency, and nuclear nonproliferation, but there are other questions to consider as 
well. If conventional or nuclear war is the problem we hope to avoid, what do we need to know 
about India and/or about Pakistan in order to proactively diffuse sources of tension before they 
lead to any escalation? We would surely need to know the contexts of the people living in both 
states: their history, religion, culture, politics, etc. Additionally, we must recall that the study of 
conflicting peoples’ physical environments is just as important as examining shared history. If 
the practitioner community could generate a sufficiently rich body of literature concerning 
transboundary water and security, policymakers in riparian states could draw on this knowledge 
to craft policy solutions for unresolved, water-related stress between them and their neighbors. 
With the above-listed ideas in mind, the purpose of this inquiry is to contribute to a more stable 
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Indo-Pacific security environment by exploring freshwater’s influence on 21st century India-
Pakistan relations. 
 This paper explores India and Pakistan’s hydropolitical challenges by analyzing the 
water-related policies of both state governments. The choice of India and Pakistan stems partially 
from academic interest, but more importantly, as a security practitioner I am aware of the 
hazards of mixing historical and contemporary hostility with nuclear weapons stockpiles. Where 
India and Pakistan are concerned, this toxic mix must not be allowed to fester further, lest it 
metastasize into a conflict with a catastrophically high body count. The central process I 
investigated was the ongoing cycle of diplomatic and political interactions between India and 
Pakistan. By employing the mixed-method software platform Dedoose, I conducted thorough 
discourse and content analyses of speech transcripts, legal documents, policy memos, and 
legislative documents that pertained to the shared Indus river system. After open coding these 
documents to identify major themes, I identified several topics to focus on through the process of 
axial coding. Eventually, I applied a selective coding  process and formed an operational theory 
at the intersections of those aforementioned themes. My ultimate goal in this research was to 
address the question: What baseline conditions are needed in the 21st century to facilitate a 
possible renegotiation or updating of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan?  
 
1.2 Thesis Overview  
 
 The format of this essay is as follows: First, I introduce the topic of my inquiry and 
describe its importance to the broader field of security studies. Next, I provide a survey of 21st 
century scholarly literature discussing transboundary water as a security concern. I combine this 
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literature review with a brief examination of the history of India-Pakistan relations that includes 
an introduction to their water-sharing agreement, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). With this 
context established, I move on to explain the selection criteria for my data sample, my 
methodological approach, and the analytical techniques to be applied to my data. I create and 
apply a set of descriptive codes to my primary data in Dedoose, present my key findings, and 
discuss their implications for India-Pakistan relations. I continue the discussion by situating my 
findings in the context of the broader study of transboundary water security, address the 
limitations in my research design, and conclude by exploring issues left unaddressed that may be 
resolved in a future inquiry.  
 
2. Literature Review: Tracing the Evolution of Water Security  
 
 Successfully resolving any security issue requires studying the challenge in question from 
as many different angles as possible. Before exploring the hydropolitical links between India and 
Pakistan specifically, it is incumbent on the researcher to survey the wider field of transboundary 
water security discourse. Searching for answers to nascent disputes over fresh water is a timeless 
yet urgent concern, and every effort should be made to understand how all riparian relationships 
are affected by sharing this most vital resource to human civilization. 
 It is also important to provide an early, working definition of this slightly amorphous 
term, “water security,” to prevent confusion later in the research process. We must also 
remember that the conception of water security, like terrorism and war, will vary depending on 
which transboundary water source we examine. A 2012 article by Christina Cook and Karen 
Bakker, “Water Security: Debating an Emerging Paradigm,” offers a useful starting point by 
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laying out four recurring themes from their expansive review of collected works. Defining this 
term water security should reflect each of the following themes: 
 
1. The quantity of exploitable water available and demand relative to it. 
2. Human vulnerability to water from natural hazards like droughts or flooding, non-natural 
hazards like pollution, and/or deliberate contamination via an act of bioterrorism. 
3. The variety of human needs for water, going far beyond drinking water to encompass 
food security (crops and livestock), energy production, hygiene and health, development 
projects, and even luxury goods.  
4. The topic of sustainability; providing access to affordable, clean water that can satisfy 
current demand while also safeguarding resources for future generations.1 
 
It is also necessary here to adopt a framework that quantifies the amount of water needed to meet 
each of the demands implicit in the four themes listed above. Water security is not an absolute 
concept, so our framework should be able to indicate varying degrees of security or lack thereof. 
Cook, Bakker, and many other scholars employ an assessment tool well-known to water studies 
known as Falkenmark’s Water Stress Index (WSI). The WSI quantifies water availability per 
capita in a given state versus the various demands on that state’s water resources. A state with a 
WSI value of 1,700 cubic meters or more per capita it is considered water sufficient, whereas a 
WSI score between 1,000 and 1,700 cubic meters per capita indicates a state is water stressed. 
Below 1,000 cubic meters per capita, a state is considered water scarce, and below 500 cubic 
 
 1Cook, Christina and Bakker, Karen. "Water Security: Debating an Emerging Paradigm."  
Global Environmental Change 22, no. 1 (2012): 97. 
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meters a state faces absolute water scarcity.2 While these WSI numbers only indicate quantity 
and not the quality of water, Falkenmark’s system is a useful framework for evaluating water 
security in a manner accessible to readers beyond the security studies field. For a sense of scale, 
one cubic meter of water is equal to 1,000 liters or approximately 264 gallons.3 
 To further refine my working definition so as to encompass more than just the quantity of 
water available, I have adopted a definition from 2007 that effectively simplifies this rather 
complex concept. In “Sink or swim? Water security for growth and development,” David Grey 
and Claudia Sadoff define water security as, “…the availability of an acceptable quantity and 
quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable 
level of water-related risks to people, environments and economies.”4 This framing helps us 
properly evaluate water security literature by clearly delineating specific levels of water stress or 
scarcity.  
 Typically, the field of security studies concerns itself with war, terrorism, and state-to-
state competition. But a growing number of scholars point to environmental degradation linked 
to climate change as a risk factor and force-multiplier in conflicts between and within states. 
Though the water security discipline itself is still taking shape, the abundance of climatic data 
available to practitioners today offers a rich avenue through which to explore perpetual security 
problems. Earlier scholarship matters, but this essay will be constrained in scope to the 21st 
century due to the recent explosion of data on this topic and the increasingly visible ways climate 
change is altering our freshwater resources. 
 
 2Cook and Bakker, Water Security, 179-180.  
 3 Volume Converter, 2021, https://converter.net/volume/1-cubic-meters-to-gallons  
 4Grey, David and Sadoff, Claudia W. "Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and 




2.1 Diverging Conceptions of Water in Security Discourse 
 
 The security literature of the last two decades can largely be grouped into one of two 
schools of thought regarding water. The more commonly held understanding of water is as a 
resource to be regulated and controlled by neoliberal economic principles. For our purposes, we 
will call this framework the “Commodity School”. However, this notion has been challenged in 
recent years by an emerging school of thought that claims water is a universal right to be 
provided regardless of what market conditions may be. For our purposes, we will call this 
framework the “Human Right School”. Where riparian states are concerned, the differences 
between these baseline notions of water manifest themselves in the decisions of policymakers 
and in the activities of water-management institutions like South Asia’s Mekong River 
Commission or the Permanent Indus Commission between India and Pakistan. When these 
differences go unnoticed or unaddressed, they can easily create barriers to the successful 
resolution of any given water dispute. As such, studying riparian states’ water-sharing policies 
should include determining the school of thought that underlies the thought processes of the 
policymakers at the negotiating table.   
 
2.2 The Commodity School 
 
 Considering transboundary water resources in a security studies context may be a 
relatively new framework in this field, but the basic conception of water held by the Commodity 
School of thought is tied to centuries-old political agreements. Salman M.A. Salman and Kishor 
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Uprety lay this correlation out in their 2002 book, Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia’s 
International Rivers: A Legal Perspective, by reviewing a chronology of international river laws 
from the 1800s to their present day. These river laws primarily dealt with navigation rights and 
the use of shared rivers as a vehicle for expanding trade.5 The focus on navigation in water laws 
would eventually shift to debates over riparian sovereignty and obligations to downstream 
neighbors due to the work of two multilateral organizations; the Institute for International Law 
(IIL) and the International Law Association (ILA).6  
 Today, fresh water has evolved from being framed as a largely environmental matter to 
being regarded as a possible source of international conflict, but many scholars retained that 
framing of water as an economic commodity; gradually propagating the ideas of the Commodity 
school of thought. The Indian scholar Ashok Swain touches on many of the ideas discussed by 
Salman and Uprety in his 2000 article, “Water Scarcity as a Source of Crises.” Specifically, 
Swain investigates a number of civil conflicts based on water development projects that in turn 
caused population displacements near the projects’ construction sites. He asserts that these 
conflicts combine with pre-existing factors like population growth to strain a state’s per capita 
water availability, concluding that “Water needs to be treated urgently both as a social and an 
economic good, necessitating the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the state.”7 
Swain’s emphasis on states as the primary actors in water policy reflects the neoliberal 
disposition of the Commodity School. This neoliberal framing of water was echoed by the team 
behind Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, written in 2008. Chapter 6 of this work 
 
 5Salman, Salman M. A. and Uprety, Kishor. Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International Rivers. 
Washington, D.C: World Bank Group, 2002, 8-10 
 6Salman and Uprety, Conflict and Cooperation, 13-20 
 7Swain, Ashok “Water scarcity as a source of crises.” in E. W. Nafziger, F. Stewart & R. Väyrynen, eds., 
War, Hunger and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, 202 
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applies the Commodity School concepts to the challenge of managing one of the other massive 
river systems of South Asia, the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Megna (GBM). Here, we see that another 
hallmark of the Commodity school of thought is the tendency to ground policy proposals in the 
ideas of the post-WWII capitalist system. Where transboundary water disputes are concerned, 
Varis et al argue that riparian states need only adopt a package of market-based solutions like 
trade liberalization, increased capital mobility among GBM states, and/or multilateral technology 
transfers.8  
 It is important to clarify here that not all Commodity School scholarship exists in perfect 
alignment. A particularly noteworthy divergence lies in discussions of how the force multiplying 
effects of climate change might compromise South Asia’s water resources. Where authors like 
Swain and the team of Salman and Uprety discuss water policy in terms of state-level action, 
others argue that international institutions have a part to play in managing shared rivers. Heather 
Cooley and Peter Gleick’s “Climate-Proofing Transboundary Water Agreements” warns against 
treating water as an exclusively state-level challenge because climate change alters 
environmental conditions on a global scale and does not acknowledge human notions of 
territorial sovereignty.9 Cooley and Gleick challenge a notion from past decades that water 
security is chiefly a matter of quantity by raising the question of how climate change could affect 
water quality, and thus the security environment of a given region:  
  
Greater analysis is needed to evaluate how water quality will be affected by 
climate change within the context of transboundary agreements. Furthermore, 
 
 8Biswas, Asit K. “Management of Ganges-Brahmaputra-Megna System: Way Forward,” in Management of 
Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008, 142-164 
 9Cooley, Heather and Gleick, Peter H. "Climate-Proofing Transboundary Water  Agreements."  
Hydrological Sciences Journal/Journal Des Sciences Hydrologiques 56, no. 4 (2011) 
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regional climate-change assessments would be more valuable for informing 
transboundary management and treaty reform if researchers included key water 
impacts, such as quality, quantity, frequency and intensity of extreme events, and 
impacts on water demands.10 
 
In essence, successful water management in the twenty-first century requires wide-reaching, 
interdisciplinary management programs that eclipse the more typical bilateral water treaties of 
the past.11 Their push for multilateral mechanisms of cooperation is bolstered by more recent 
analyses of water frameworks by Marko Keskinen and Joseph Guillaume, as well as Andrea 
Gerlak and Farhad Mukhtarov, both in 2016. These authors suggest an interdisciplinary approach 
to crafting policy that situates water in a wider network of interlinked issues dubbed the “Water-
Energy-Food Nexus (WEF).” This WEF Nexus approach integrates direct water consumption for 
drinking or cooking with the energy required to produce said water, along with the water inputs 
needed to grow crops and raise livestock, into a nuanced framing of water as a central driver of 
state growth.12 In this, Gerlak and Mukhtarov echo the ideas of Cooley and Gleick in their 
assessment that some manner of multilateral effort is needed to manage transboundary waters. In 
this instance, Gerlak and Mukhtarov advocate for River Basin Organizations (RBOs) like the 
Mekong River Commission to promote sustainable, harmonious water-sharing among riparian 
states.13 
 
 10Cooley and Gleick, Climate Proofing, 715 
 11Cooley and Gleick, 717-718 
 12Keskinen, Marko, Guillaume, Joseph Kattelus, Mirja, Porkka, Miina, Räsänen, Timo, Varis, Olli.  
"The Water-Energy-Food Nexus and the Transboundary Context: Insights from Large Asian Rivers." Water 
(Basel) 8, no. 5 (2016): 13 
 13Gerlak, Andrea K. and Mukhtarov, Farhad. "Many Faces of Security: Discursive Framing in Cross-
Border Natural Resource Governance in the Mekong River Commission." Globalizations 13, no. 6 (2016): 723- 724 
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 The Commodity school of thought is a neoliberal, capitalist framework for transboundary 
water management, despite some disagreement about the role of states versus multilateral 
institutions. To this school, water is a resource like wheat or gold that can be controlled within 
the current economic system as part of today’s global supply chain, while simultaneously 
balancing current water needs with the realities of climate change.14 The principles of this school 
originate in international legal issues of navigation and trade, indicating a clear priority on 
economic growth as a catch-all answer to questions of water security. From here, we turn to 
literature that challenges the financial emphasis of the Commodity School.  
 
2.3 The Human Right School 
  
 In the last three decades or so, a growing body of literature states that governments 
should regard water as a universal right and legislate accordingly. To be clear, the Human Right 
school of thought acknowledges the importance of economic growth much like the Commodity 
school. However, this school remains primarily concerned with abstract concepts of human 
rights that are harder to codify into concrete law. For example, in 2017 the legal scholar Waseem 
Ahmad Qureshi reviewed a list of declarations and conventions from the United Nations that 
implicitly or directly address water as a human right. The agreements he cites include, among 
others: Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, the UN Watercourses Convention, the Stockholm Declaration, the Dublin Statement, 
and the more recent Political Declaration of 2016.15 Qureshi’s Pakistani perspective is on full 
 
 14Grey and Sadoff, Sink or Swim, 545-571. 
 15Qureshi, Waseem Ahmad. “Water as a Human Right: A Case Study of the Pakistan-India Water 
Conflict,” Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, 2017, 381-389 
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display as he applies these international decrees to India and Pakistan’s tense sharing of the 
Indus river system, but his emphasis on the United Nations as a key multilateral institution in 
shaping water security is by no means misplaced. The Human Right school of thought mostly 
originated in the work of globe-spanning bodies like the UN, much like the Commodity school 
originated in part from legal precedent set by the Act of Congress of Vienna in 1815.16 To the 
Human Right school, concepts like water rights gain their legitimacy from the work of 
international institutions. States matter, but only as the mechanism for disseminating 
international consensus once it is decided. Primacy still lies with the international organizations 
where the right to water was born in the first place. In addition, the Human Right school has been 
experiencing a surge in momentum since the turn of the century, specifically in the form of, “…a 
significant upswing in [legal] cases addressing water issues through the lens of human rights 
[since 2000]…The timing of the turn to the right to water correlates with the oft-quoted General 
Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) in 2002.”17 
 Scholarship espousing the Human Right school’s framing of water places heavy 
emphasis on a sense of community spirit among riparian states; a sort of “we’re all in this 
together” mentality. Chief among the proponents of the Human Right school is, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the United Nations. Early in the 2000s, the UN published its first World Water 
Development Report titled, “Water for People, Water for Life,” which tied the right to water to 
the role it plays in another established human right, the right to health.18 Alongside these moral 
 
 16Salman and Uprety, 8-12 
 17Langford, Malcolm, and Anna Russell. The Human Right to Water: Theory, Practice, and Prospects.  
Cambridge-United Kingdom, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press 2017, 6-7. 
 18United Nations World Water Development Report. “Water for People, Water for Life,”  
UNESCO and Berghahn Books, Barcelona, Spain 2003, 99-126 
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arguments about human rights, the Human Right school frequently touches on ways that water 
sharing is a mutually beneficial act for all riparian states.19 Equity and expanding access are the 
guideposts of the Human Right school. 
 Contemporary water security discourse is an evolving conceptual framework, so it is 
incumbent upon us to remember that it is too soon to fully categorize water as either a 
commodity or a human right. The boundaries between schools are still quite permeable, and 
while the Commodity and Human Right schools of thought diverge over solutions to South 
Asia’s water crisis, they also share a few significant ideas. Both schools drew their founding 
ideas and sense of legitimacy from some form of international agreement among states. The 
Human Right school asserts that  use of shared waters comes with a corresponding obligation to 
consider the needs of riparian neighbors downstream out of a sense of fairness.20 The 
Commodity school shares this desire for riparian cooperation but approaches the issue from a 
legal standpoint. Salman and Uprety reference a particular line in Geneva Protocol of 1923: “If 
such development [of hydropower] involves the use of the territory of another state, or may 
cause prejudice to another state, those states shall enter into negotiations with a view to conclude 
an agreement.”21 Additionally, scholars from both schools acknowledge transboundary water’s 
dual nature as a catalyst for both cooperation and conflict among riparian states. This duality is 
noted throughout 21st century literature by scholars like Swain in 2000, Grey and Sadoff in 2007,  
Cooley and Gleick in 2011, and Keskinen et al in 2016. More than anything, this shared 
recognition among diverging schools of thought speaks to just how complex inter-state 
relationships become where water-sharing is concerned.  
 
 19United Nations, World Water Development Report, 291-300 
 20Langford and Malcom, The Human Right to Water, 150 
 21Salman and Uprety, 17 
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 Both schools of thought also appear to agree on the fact that, thus far, no single approach 
or policy exists that fully resolves all of South Asia’s water troubles. Given the scale and 
variation of the hydrological profile of the region, it should come as no great shock that a one-
size-fits-all strategy for transboundary water management continues to elude the international 
community. While the water-energy-food nexus concept from the Keskinen piece provides a 
multidisciplinary solution, the authors of the study were quick to note that, “…no commonly 
agreed definition or conceptual framework for the [water-energy-food] nexus has emerged and 
therefore different organizations and authors—intentionally or not—interpret its essence quite 
differently.”22 The team that wrote “Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes” in 2008 
also stresses this truth among South Asia’s rivers, writing that, “Therefore, in planning and 
management terms, it is simply impossible to consider GBM [the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Megna 
river system] as one system because of its sheer size, complexities and multinational 
character.”23 Whichever way one turns, complete solutions to the larger question of South Asia’s 
water security have yet to be crafted. Such a perfect solution likely doesn’t exist, meaning that 
further inquiry is warranted if only because the problem remains unsolved. In South Asia’s 
context, all attempts to craft solutions to transboundary water disputes are still worth the work 
due to the ever-present potential for freshwater tensions to spark conflicts between riparian 
neighbors. Turning back to India and Pakistan in particular, the ever-present risk of escalation 
over the tributaries of the Indus river system threatens hundreds of millions of lives if that 
unthinkable yet quite possible nuclear exchange were to happen. There are still gaps in the 
 
 22Keskinen et al, The Water-Energy-Food Nexus, 1-2 
 23Varis, Olli, Biswas, Asit K., Tortajada, Cecilia, and SpringerLink. Management of Transboundary Rivers 




literature of these emerging schools of thought that should be filled in service of finding the next 
policy that resolves a given Indo-Pak water dispute even a tiny bit more effectively than the last 
attempt. I hope the findings of this inquiry will add value to the larger body of India-Pakistan 
security literature and bring us closer to a future where the Indus is no longer an existential threat 
to India, Pakistan, or any other state in South Asia. 
 To summarize, the idea of freshwater as a driver of security issues is relatively new to the 
broader discipline of security studies. Freshwater resource management began as a primarily 
domestic, environmental concern, but in recent decades this issue has grown into a critical aspect 
of state security as climate change grows more visible in daily life. Current water security 
literature reflects two predominant perspectives through which to view fresh water: as a 
commodity, or as a human right. The commodity school of thought holds that freshwater 
resources can be managed within the current neoliberal status quo, while the human right school 
of thought is more willing to challenge assumptions and push for larger reforms. Both schools of 
thought view states as primary actors, but disagree on the goals those actors should work 
towards. These two schools of thought draw legitimacy from different expressions of 
international  agreement and espouse different policy solutions, but they are by no means 
mutually exclusive. Despite these differences, the underlying goal of both schools is providing 
water to as many people as possible; a task that remains incredibly difficult in many parts of the 
Indo-Pacific region.   
 
3. Historical Context: India-Pakistan Relations and the Indus  
 
 Much of the animosity that India and Pakistan hold towards one another can be traced 
back to the disastrous way that Pakistan was born. It was willed into existence as the British 
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withdrew their Raj government from colonial India just after World War II by drawing new lines 
on a map of the South Asia subcontinent. Arguably, what mattered most in the birth of this new 
state was the haste with which the British ceded their power. The process of creating Pakistan 
out of previously Indian territory was completed in just forty days, and the public announcement 
of this entirely new state was not made until just after it had come into legal effect.24 The 
botched partition quickly sewed confusion and chaos among the citizens of India and newly 
formed Pakistan which sparked a horrific outburst of sectarian violence that reverberates through 
history to the present day. Approximately 1 million people were killed and many more were 
displaced,25 and the India-Pakistan relationship has yet to fully recover from the trauma. Since 
the partition took place, these two states have fought several conventional wars and continue to 
experience a cycle of tit-for-tat skirmishes along their shared borders. The Indo-Pak conflict was 
supercharged over the course of the late 20th century when Pakistan achieved nuclear strike 
capability, causing India to follow suit not long after. Now, hundreds of millions of people living 
in South Asia face the risk of getting caught up in India and Pakistan’s hostile relationship in the 
event that either state decided to launch a nuclear attack on the other.   
 
 
 24Chakrabarti, Shantanu, “Interpreting the legacy of Partition in the Subcontinent: Indian and Pakistani 
perspectives.” Politeja, no. 40 (2016): 21-30. 
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 After their first conventional war in 1947-48, India and Pakistan entered into negotiations 
over use of the Indus (pictured above) with the World Bank acting as mediator, eventually 
signing the landmark Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960.26 Treaty Articles II through IV 
establish which state controls which tributary of the larger Indus system; with the Sutlej, Beas, 
and Ravi given to India, and the Indus (a namesake tributary), Chenab, and Jhelum given to 
Pakistan.27 The treaty’s objective of enshrining cooperative over competitive use of the Indus is 
highly visible throughout the document. Beyond merely deciding which state can use which 
river, the IWT’s Article VI mandates regular bilateral data exchanges , and Article VII confirms 
 




United Nations, Indus Waters Treaty between Pakistan and India.  
 United Nations Treaty Series, 1960, 2-5.  
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both states’ “…intention to cooperate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible extent.”28 The 
principal mechanism of all this mutual cooperation is provided for India and Pakistan in the form 
of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), created by the language of Article VIII.29 In addition, 
the architects of the IWT demonstrated incredible foresight by laying out methods for resolving 
disputes that would undoubtedly arise in the future; these being Article IX’s Neutral Expert and 
Court of Arbitration processes.30 
 Despite continuing hostile relations between India and Pakistan, the IWT has not been 
broken to this day. However, the Indus Waters Treaty is far from perfect. First and foremost, the 
physical origin of the Indus river system lies in the Tibetan Plateau of Southwestern China and is 
fed by melting snow and ice from the Himalaya Mountains. That snow and ice is melting at 
increasing rates due to climate change, creating higher flood risk in the near-term and higher risk 
of drought in the long-term.31 It is here that we can observe a weakness in the IWT; the original 
text does address how either state should respond to growing stress along the Indus resulting 
from climate change.32 Considering how the physical environment of South Asia is already 
altering, India and Pakistan both have legitimate reasons to seek an updating of the IWT that 
brings reflects the climatic realities of the 21st century. Even so, the annual meetings of the PIC 
are largely formulaic and highly technical in nature, and the idea of jointly updating the Treaty 
has yet to gain any significant traction. 
 Simply put, Indo-Pak relations are immensely complicated on all fronts, including their 
shared water security environment. Both states mistrust and fear one another due to an intricate 
 
 28 United Nations, Indus Waters Treaty, 6 
 29 Indus Waters Treaty, 8 
 30 Indus Waters Treaty, 7-9 
 31 Bhattacharyya, Arpita and Werz, Michael. “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in South Asia: 
Rising Tensions and Policy Options Across the Subcontinent.” Center for American Progress, 2012.  
 32 United Nations, Indus Waters Treaty. 
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mix of historical, religious, and political reasons tracing back to the violence of partition. Yet 
they are trapped in their tense riparian relationship, meaning these wary neighbors must continue 
interacting with one another when utilizing the waters of the Indus system. This combination of 
factors spells out a formula for continued stress in the Indo-Pak relationship before adding in the 
force-multiplier of nuclear missiles pointed at each other. With all this in mind, there is a 
veritable mountain of reasons why India and Pakistan’s negotiations over water might fail. Even 
so, laying the failure to improve the IWT on history would be overly simplistic. To be clear, it is 
fair to consider historical grievances, religious tensions, and cultural differences in any analysis 
of why India and Pakistan dislike each other. At the same time, we should not consign this issue 
to the bin of unsolvable global challenges. Doing so would be tantamount to committing 
hundreds of millions of South Asians to living their whole lives facing an existential threat of 
nuclear war that never dissipates, simply because past events happened the way they happened. 
Assigning responsibility for failed Indo-Pak water negotiations to historical issues also discounts 
the 70+ years of scholarly inquiry that have taken place since the partition. We must face the 
inconvenient truth that the 21st century is altering South Asia’s physical environment in ways 
not witnessed at the time the IWT was signed. Only continued study will help refine our 
understanding of Indus security issues, and only continued effort will lead to the lasting solutions 
this admittedly daunting challenge requires. History, like climate change, is a living issue, and 
solving historical problems requires acknowledging them as events of the past that still play a 







 Returning to this inquiry’s central question of what conditions are needed on-the-ground 
for a possible IWT renegotiation, there are a number of specific concepts and data points to 
examine as part of the selective coding process of a Grounded Theory approach. First, the 
baseline conception of water both states hold is highly valuable information when attempting to 
create a theory sufficiently grounded in Indo-Pak Indus policy. Even before considering other 
conditions for a successful international agreement like coinciding interests between two 
governments, domestic political goodwill, the capacity of both party’s diplomatic corps, or 
strategic defense concerns, we must first attempt to confirm what the waters of the Indus system 
mean to India and Pakistan’s governments as clearly as possible. If this information is not 
established up front, the risk of either state misunderstanding the other’s proposals grows much 
larger, as does the risk of failing to reach any eventual agreement. Accordingly, I intend to 
answer this inquiry’s research question by assessing each state’s ideas and beliefs about water as 
they are reflected in the past twenty years of government policy. Through the use of Grounded 
Theory analytical techniques, I will uncover the critical ideas and relevant categories of 
information hidden in my data sample and use them to inductively generate a working theory 
that addresses my research question.  
 My analysis focuses primarily on determining which of the two schools of thought are 
practiced by India and Pakistan, but other issues connected to Indus water security were included 
as well. For example, climate change-related hazards experienced in South Asia are an important 
aspect of transboundary water security. I began by segmenting information from my data in an 
open coding process to filter out aspects of Indus water policy that are only somewhat connected 
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to my research question. In particular, the numerous manifestations of climate change in the 
Indo-Pacific region deserve our attention, so the open coding process will further parse the 
phenomenon of climate change into a set of specific outcomes such as rising heat, flooding, 
droughts, and melting Himalayan ice and snow. Once enough open coding was completed, a 
number of climate change impacts could be discarded as largely irrelevant to this study, such as 
the growth in disease-carrying pest populations. The remaining concepts and the properties they 
hold formed a set of axial codes that I used as analytical lenses through which to continue 
dissecting data and adjusting the theory I was developing. To make this process as effective as 
possible, I used the mixed-methods research platform Dedoose to structure my analysis and 
findings. After the open coding process highlighted which concepts are most relevant to my 
central issue of which water school of thought each state holds to, I narrowed my focus to those 
critical concepts that became the foundation of my axial codes. By rearranging these axial codes 
in ways that differed from those used during open coding, I examined the intersecting points of 
these codes and to further refine my theory of conditions that can produce successful Indo-Pak 
negotiations over the IWT. I also drew on the many memos I wrote throughout the coding 
process in order to adjust my developing theory when necessary. 
 To assist in gathering my data sample, I identified the departments of the central 
governments of both India and Pakistan that are involved in setting water policy. The scope of 
this research is intentionally restricted to the 21st century due to time constraints, meaning only 
documents dated January 1st, 2000 or later could be included. Since this inquiry was specific to 
the Indus alone, data sources referring to the other major rivers of South Asia were excluded. For 
example, India’s policies regarding the Ganges or Brahmaputra rivers were not directly relevant 
to my research question, so those rivers will have to wait for another study.  
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 When evaluating any security environment, it is important to remember that state 
governments convey their priorities and beliefs in the responses they give to real or perceived 
stress. Since matters of Indus water security have reached the international stage, my data will 
also come from sources outside India and Pakistan. Regarding which sources to use outside my 
two principal states, water is often addressed at relevant meetings of the United Nations attended 
by India and Pakistan. For example, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) convenes 
meetings of the Human Rights Council (HRC), where water and food security are often 
discussed. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is involved in debating 
water issues as well. Accordingly, I mined the UN Digital Archive to pull joint statements, 
declarations, agreements, and/or speech transcripts that mention water and involved either India 
or Pakistan (or both). In addition, another important method that governments employ to signal 
their beliefs and priorities is when a current official writes an article for journalistic outlets or 
appears on TV programs to discuss policy. Sensitive information will not be included in a 
newspaper article of course, but even the comparatively simple language used in an Op-ed by a 
Pakistani government official can offer quite rich data. Consequently, I pulled a small sample of 
articles from the Times of India’s online archive, as it is the largest journalistic archive of news 
originating in the region that is available to me.  
 The earlier literature review outlines a central phenomenon to follow in this research 
project; the question of which school of thought is being employed (Commodity or Human 
Right), by which state(s), and in what context. With data sample in hand, I used the central ideas 
and concepts drawn from reading each document to create a set of defined codes that I input into 
Dedoose as part of the open coding process. This stage of the research process was conducted a 
alongside the axial coding process as well, with adjustments to my codes in Dedoose made as 
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necessary. Taking these steps ultimately contributed to more compelling results during the 
selective coding process later on in the project. In addition, the revisions I made yielded a final 
set of codes, a ‘Code Tree,’ that more accurately illustrated and supported my findings. 
 As just mentioned, I used Dedoose throughout open, axial, and selective coding to pore 
through India and Pakistan’s water policies from the past two decades. Once the analysis was 
complete, I used my findings to form the basis of a theory that attempts to answer the research 
question of this project, repeated here: What baseline conditions are needed in the 21st century 
to facilitate a possible renegotiation or updating of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India 
and Pakistan? It is important to clarify here that I did not intend to answer whether all (or none) 
of these conditions for successful negotiation were present, as the timing of this project strictly 
curtailed how deep I might have dug. The scope of this research also precluded investigating 
whether or not bilateral negotiations always succeed if certain conditions are present, or if these 
conditions just mean success is more likely. Rather, I looked for the presence of what I believe is 
the most crucial condition for success; Namely, whether India and Pakistan share the same 
conception of water or not. The policy proposals shared during an Indo-Pak negotiation over the 
IWT should, at the very least, remain grounded in a mutually held view of what the waters of the 
Indus mean to each party. If both states espouse conflicting views of their shared waters, we will 
know that this fundamental dissonance between the two states must be resolved before any future 






5. Key Findings and Discussion 
 
 The key findings of this inquiry are briefly outlined below, with a more detailed 
discussion following accordingly. Each finding is backed with corresponding evidence from 
Dedoose listed in Appendix II. As mentioned earlier, this inquiry’s primary data came from a 
number of Indian and Pakistani government agencies, newspaper articles, and the relevant parts 
of the United Nations. Specifically, the following is a short list of sources where this data was 
obtained: 
India & Pakistan Sources 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs   The Ministry of Environment 
The Ministry of Climate Change   The Office of the Prime Minister 
The Ministry of Planning, Development,             The Ministry of Water Resources 
& Reform (Pakistan) 
 
The Permanent Indus Commission (India)            The Permanent Indus Commission (Pakistan) 
    
Other Sources 
The Times of India     The UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
The UN Human Rights Council (HRC)  The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
 
5.1 Key Finding #1: Likely the most significant finding of this inquiry is that India and Pakistan 
do not take an ”either/or” approach to the schools of thought about water security, but rather 
employ both the Human Right and the Commodity schools. The literature review established that 
the Human Right and Commodity schools hold some common ideas, but the schools’ natural 
points of divergence also raise a question of how compatible (or incompatible) they could 
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ultimately be. If we were somehow able to confirm that a Commodity School approach to water 
policy was fundamentally irreconcilable with a Human Right school approach, such a finding 
would present a serious impediment to future Indus river collaboration as long as India and 
Pakistan held opposing views. The relationship between these two states is tense enough already, 
but this conclusion indicates that a greater degree of commonality is indeed achievable. 
 
5.2 Key Finding #2: Pakistan and India both show a significant preference for employing the 
highest levels of government to convey Indus water policy in public view (e.g. speeches and/or 
the text of government documents). The data indicates a higher rate of speeches being made by 
policymakers that represent Ministry/Cabinet-level authority or higher (See Appendix II, Figures 
1 and 2). We will discuss the implications of this finding shortly. 
 
5.3 Key Finding #3: India and Pakistan do not directly mention each other in their respective 
policy documents (Figure 3-6), a conclusion that contrasts with both states’ use of inflammatory 
rhetoric when it suits their purposes. This finding tells us a few interesting things about each 
government’s metaphorical state of mind and the presence (or absence) of rational actors, which 
will be discussed in detail in a moment. 
 
5.4 Discussion of Key Findings 
 
 As just mentioned, Finding #1 is likely the most significant result of this inquiry because 
it illustrates two items to consider while polishing the eventual theoretical framework that 
corresponds to the research question at the center of this study. First, it confirms that, where 
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water security is concerned, the Commodity and Human Right schools of thought are not 
mutually exclusive frameworks. Secondly, it establishes that the central governments of India 
and Pakistan do indeed share a similar perception of what the Indus means to their respective 
states. Those views are not perfectly aligned of course, but they do not need to be identical to 
still support continued attempts at Indo-Pak hydro-diplomacy. This shared understanding of the 
waters of the Indus does not guarantee anything, but it does provide a strong incentive for both 
states to attempt the admittedly difficult task of updating any part of their water-sharing treaty. 
 To further illustrate Key Finding #1, consider an example from one of the primary 
sources of this investigation. The Preamble of India’s 2012 National Water Policy reads: 
 
With a growing population and rising needs of a fast-developing nation as well as 
the given indications of the impact of climate change, availability of utilizable 
water will be under further strain in future with the possibility of deepening water 
conflicts among different user groups. Low consciousness about the scarcity of 
water and its life sustaining and economic value results in its mismanagement, 
wastage, and inefficient use, as also pollution and reduction of flows below 
minimum ecological needs. In addition, there are inequities in distribution and 
lack of a unified perspective…33 
 
Recalling the literature review and the underlying principles informing the Commodity and 
Human Right schools of thought, we can see how both schools are reflected in the above 
passage. The Commodity school’s emphasis on water as an economic driver is stated literally in 
 
 33 Ministry of Water Resources. National Water Policy (2012), Government of India, New Delhi, India, 1. 
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the line, “…the scarcity of water and its life sustaining and economic value…,” while the Human 
Right school’s focus on expanding access to water for vulnerable populations is represented by 
the last line, “In addition, there are inequities in distribution and lack of a unified 
perspective…”34 Sentiments like the one above are present throughout the Indian policy 
documents in this inquiry’s data sample.  
 To further confirm that the Human Right and Commodity schools of thought are not 
mutually exclusive, we must also consider examples from the Pakistani government. Two 
successive passages from Pakistan’s 2002 National Water Sector Strategy, Volume 2 show how 
ideas from the Commodity and Human Right schools can be melded together. In this document’s 
list of national objectives for Pakistan’s water sector, we see that the first two items relate to 
expanding access to both clean water and functional sewage systems for the urban population, 
while the next part of the list lays out the state’s financial objectives in terms of cost recovery, 
financial viability, and private sector participation in the water sector.35 Similar passages 
expressing varying combinations of Commodity and Human Right school ideas can be found 
throughout both states’ parts of the data sample. The notations and memos I wrote in Dedoose 
during open and axial coding provide additional evidence that mixing the two schools is a fairly 
common practice. Ultimately, the fact that India and Pakistan are not approaching their water 
security relationship from diametrically opposed stances constitutes what I believe to be the most 
critical baseline condition for updating the IWT, and a bedrock aspect of my theory of successful 
Indo-Pak water negotiations; a shared understanding of the water over which they negotiate. 
 
 34 National Water Policy (2012), Government of India 
 35 Ministry of Water and Power. “National Water Sector Strategy: Volume 2,” Government of Pakistan, 
2002. 
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 Turning now to Key Finding #2, here the data from the axial coding phase indicates a 
high level of commitment to Indus water security shared by the governments of India and 
Pakistan. The data shows that both states engage one another with Cabinet/Minister-level 
officials or heads of state; a very positive sign. This finding means that, for a hypothetical, 
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister is not being met by undersecretary-level officials from India during 
water-related bilateral engagements, or vice versa. If this imbalance did occur, either government 
would feel slighted by the others’ lack of commitment and quite possibly walk away from the 
negotiating table regardless of topic. Considering the government offices that supplied the 
documents of this data sample, Key Finding #2 confirms that both states convey the seriousness 
of their intent by disseminating it from elevated positions on the chain of command, so to speak. 
For example, when the Pakistani government wanted to emphasize water security in a global 
forum in 2015, Prime Minister Imran Khan himself delivered those remarks (See Appendix I). A 
similar (though not identical) level of dedication to water security is visible in India’s decision to 
merge its formerly disorganized water policy apparatus into the Jal Shakti Ministry.36 Turning to 
the working theory that this inquiry seeks, we can confidently state one part of it here: One of the 
conditions needed to facilitate a renegotiation or updating of the IWT is a matching level of 
commitment shown by both states, preferably at the highest levels of power. 
 Finally, Key Finding #3 indicates that there were very few if any instances of one state 
mentioning the other by name anywhere in the data sample (See Appendix II). To be clear, this 
inquiry is focused on a small sample of data, and more direct mention of either state is entirely 
possible. Even so, domestic policy documents do not typically refer to other states beyond vague 
expressions like, “working with partners and allies.” But this lack of calling one another out in 
 
 36 “Govt Forms 'Jal Shakti' Ministry by Merging Water Resources and Drinking Water Ministries.” Edited 
by Sreekumaran Nettath, BusinessLine, The Hindu BusinessLine, 31 May 2019 
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policy documents contrasts with strident rhetoric found in more public discourse. Consider the 
tense exchange between India and Pakistan in 2016, when Prime Minister Modi suspended 
recurring Permanent Indus Commission talks until Pakistan-sponsored terror ended in India. This 
declaration by Modi prompted Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz to immediately 
reply that revoking the IWT could be considered an act of war, and Pakistani Senator Sherry 
Rehman to accuse India of adopting a policy of “water terrorism” against Pakistan.37 If we knew 
nothing of India and Pakistan’s policy documents, public exchanges like this one would raise 
more than a few alarm bells. But by looking at the moderated phrases of both states’ policy 
documents, we can feel a bit more reassured that the underlying policies of these two states are 
not fully driven by toxic animosity. Essentially, this finding indicates that Indo-Pak relations 
have not degraded as far as accusations of “water terrorism” might lead us to believe. Both state 
governments are led by actors who make rational choices based on information available to 
them. As an element of an overarching theory of the conditions for successful IWT renegotiation, 
Key Finding #3 points to another vital baseline: the continued presence of politically rational 
actors in control of both governments.  
 Though still incomplete at this stage of the process, the three Key Findings of this 
research project can be combined to generate a preliminary framework to guide future 
hydropolitical engagements between India and Pakistan. For any chance of success, India and 
Pakistan must come to hold a certain level of alignment in order to possibly renegotiate the Indus 
Waters Treaty. Consider the findings of this study as examples of what shape this alignment 
might take: a common perception or understanding of the water itself, a matching level of 
commitment at the highest levels of government, and the continued presence of politically 
 
 37 “Revocation of Indus Waters Treaty Can Be Taken as an Act of War: Sartaj Aziz.” Edited by Dawn.com, 
DAWN, 27 Sept. 2016, www.dawn.com/news/1286437.   
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rational actors in control of both governments. With this operational theory in mind, the path 
forward in this line of water security-related inquiry grows a bit clearer. This research does not 
provide a complete solution, but it does demonstrate that there is ample room to build on its 
findings in future study. 
 
6. Research Design Discussion 
 
 Considering the findings discussed above, my preconceptions of Indo-Pak water security 
were quickly proven to be a bit narrow in scope. My early understanding of the Commodity and 
Human Right schools of thought regarded water as an “either/or” resource; either a commodity 
to be controlled by neoliberal market forces, or a human right to be managed by states acting out 
the consensus of international institutions devoted to equitable access. But at the end of this 
inquiry, it is clear that the governments of India and Pakistan employ a “both schools” approach 
to their water policies. This more nuanced view of the Indus should offer a small degree of relief 
to worried onlookers within and beyond the region. When even a slight misunderstanding could 
catalyze a nuclear exchange of any scale, any and all information that could lower that possibility 
is most welcome. 
 Invariably, there were a number of limitations to grapple with during this project, some 
intentional and some not. In the beginning, I framed this study with the intent of focusing on 
water alone, but in hindsight this choice was overly narrow. My initial data sample contained a 
number of documents related to the idea of a human Right to Food, but they did not directly 
speak to the connection between food and water. This relationship was heavily implied in these 
food-related data sources, but the connection was not clear enough to draw conclusions from. As 
a result, I felt compelled to discard nearly half of my data sample and consider only those 
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documents directly relating to the riparian aspect of the broader Indo-Pak relationship. 
 Eventually, my data sample became unbalanced from its even split between Indian and 
Pakistani sources . In the end, these primary sources were skewed towards Indian documents and 
away from the corresponding papers from Pakistan. Additionally, the data sample was no longer 
balanced across the twenty-year timeframe of the investigation as the initial data sample was. 
Secondary sources provided useful reference material to fill in the gaps, but they did not directly 
represent the governments of India or Pakistan and thus could not be considered primary data. 
Redefining this inquiry to include the Right to Food and its inherent connection to water security 
could have generated more robust findings, but also would have expanded the data sample and 
scope of this project far beyond what was realistically possible while still operating within the 
parameters of this project. If I could repeat this research, I would ideally do so in close 
cooperation with a small research team which would have permitted the expansion my research 
question to touch on food production as a factor in the Indus water security environment. In any 
case, my findings likely changed as a result of these exigent circumstances, but that just means 
there is ample room for continued research on the Indus and its role in South Asia’s security 
environment. 
 My research design was also hindered by the inevitable language barrier issues that so 
often accompany research in the international affairs arena. Relying on English translations of 
documents naturally reduced the availability of primary data accessible on the Indian and 
Pakistani government’s relevant websites. Perhaps the native versions of these sites have 
additional documents that would provide even greater impetus to assemble a research team with 
appropriate language skills for any future projects. For a perfect illustration of the linguistic 
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challenge one faces during the research process, consider the very first passage in the Preamble 
of Pakistan’s 2009 National Drinking Water Policy: 
 
The Government of Pakistan, while recognizing that access to safe drinking water 
is the basic human right of every citizen and that it is the responsibility of the state 
to ensure its provision to all citizens, is committed to provision of adequate quantity 
of safe drinking water to the entire population at an affordable cost and in an 
equitable, efficient and sustainable manner.38 
 
The language issue we see here changes depending on which of the two national languages was 
used in writing this document, Urdu or English. I could not confirm this question either way, as I 
could not contact the original authors of the document itself for clarification. But even if it was 
first written in English by a native speaker, consider just one word in the above passage: “while.” 
This word can be read in two different ways, with each reading changing this sentence’s meaning 
dramatically. The first Oxford definition of "while" includes the meaning, "at the same time" and 
includes the word "meanwhile," where the second Oxford definition of "while" includes the 
meaning "whereas" that indicates a contrast of some kind.39 So if we were to assume the first 
definition, the word “while” means the ideas of this entire sentence are inclusive of each other. 
So one may interpret this passage as stating that the government of Pakistan recognizes the 
human right to safe drinking water at the same time as it is committed to providing this resource, 
sufficiently and equitably, at an affordable cost. In this reading, the passage takes the "both 
 
 38 Ministry of Environment. National Drinking Water Policy, Government of Pakistan, 2009.  
 39 Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries. Definition of “while,” 2021, 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/.  
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schools of thought" stance in asserting that water is both a human right and a commodity to be 
provided "at affordable cost" (as in, not for free). In contrast, the second definition of the word 
“while” puts the main ideas of the passage in contrast with one another. One might rephrase this 
sentence to read as the government of Pakistan acknowledging the human right to water and 
states its commitment to providing it sufficiently and adequately, but at a cost. If the first reading 
is an "inclusive" stance where both the right to water and its equitable provision at cost are 
considered, the second reading indicates that the government of Pakistan acknowledges the right 
to water but chooses to frame its water policy in terms of provision at an affordable cost. This 
second reading implies that Pakistan’s larger motive is the issue of cost rather than the issue of 
providing water to all.  
 Both the Commodity and Human Right schools of thought are reflected in both readings 
of the above passage, but that second reading also communicates that Pakistan's government is 
tacitly aware that it cannot provide water to its people without a certain cost. In the reading of a 
single word, we can see two distinct interpretations that shift the Pakistani government closer to 
the "Commodity" school than the "Human Right" school, even if only by a degree. Such is the 
unavoidable nature of conducting research outside one’s native language(s).  
 There is one other limiting factor in my research design that is worth discussing here, the 
same limitation that has recently upended large cross-sections of global society: COVID-19. The 
pandemic introduced an exhaustive (and exhausting) list of obstacles to the research process, 
both physical and mental. Suffice to say, recreating this research should ideally take place in a 
post-pandemic setting, but when that may be is a question for the Center for Disease Control 
and/or World Health Organization.  
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7. Conclusion  
 
 Climate change in South Asia is much more visible in 21st century life than it was when 
the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960. Thankfully, the treaty has survived countless border 
clashes, terrorist attacks, and several conventional wars between India and Pakistan without 
being breached. However, both states have legitimate reasons to seek an updating of the IWT 
that reflects the growing pressure climate change is applying to the Indus; a pressure that was not 
well known when the treaty was originally written. Beyond climate change, both states face 
rising demand for water due to their respective demographic and economic growth, which raises 
the question of what prerequisite conditions are needed to succeed in international agreements. 
To this end, I have attempted to examine whether any hydropolitical common ground might exist 
in the contemporary India-Pakistan relationship. The results of this inquiry can be formulated 
into the beginning of a theory of the conditions for success in bilateral riparian negotiations. To 
raise the chances of success, India and Pakistan must share (at least) a common understanding of 
the water over which they negotiate, a matching level of commitment to water security at the 
highest levels of government, and the continued presence of politically rational actors in control 
of both governments. There are likely other conditions to search for, but these three operate as a 
foundation for future academic inquiry as well as for future riparian engagements between India 
and Pakistan. 
 Considering the research agenda of the water security community beyond South Asia, I 
am confident that there is value in further exploration of exactly how fresh water influences 
bilateral interactions among riparian states. Since climate change is altering each tributary of the 
larger Indus system in different ways, a one-size-fits-all inquiry may not be the most effective 
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approach. Instead, future researchers could attempt to identify and measure how each individual 
tributary influences Indo-Pak security. That knowledge could dovetail with other research 
exploring how directly (or indirectly) the Indus acts to connect climate change to the risk of a 
nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. Within the umbrella concept of climate change, 
each type of environmental change is worth exploring. Literature discussing the link between 
heat and the risk of political violence already exists as relates to Africa, but why stop there? This 
causal relationship is certainly worth investigating in South Asia as well given the fact that rising 
heat is already documentable throughout the region. If rising heat can increase the risk of 
violence, can improved access to water mitigate the underlying grievances that might inflame a 
group of people to violent acts? The need to understand questions like these and others like them 
will only grow as time passes and climate change becomes a more pronounced element of human 
society. 
 Additionally, this inquiry touches on the topic of international agreements, another topic 
that should be factored into future studies of the Indus. Exploring how freshwater resources 
influence the success or failure of bilateral or multilateral agreements could bolster practitioner 
and policymaker attempts to craft more effective treaties. Maybe the theory begun by this inquiry 
could be expanded upon by studying bilateral agreements specifically related to each shared river 
around the world. Since international agreements often involve coercion and/or a mutually 
beneficial alignment of interests, determining where water security fits into this picture would be 
valuable data for future negotiations over transboundary rivers in or beyond South Asia. Going 
forward, any attempt to understand how our changing waters will in turn change our lives is 
worth pursuing. Future inquiries in this area would benefit immensely from native language 
capabilities and a small team of researchers to assist in analyzing and processing data. The 
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findings from this particular river may generate a new framework or set of best practices to 
employ when studying other disputed water sources like the Colorado or Rhine Rivers. 
Additionally, a thorough examination of the interplay between the right to water and the right to 
food would add depth to future studies of the Indus or any other transboundary river. 
 All of the transboundary water resources of the world are growing increasingly stressed 
by a combination of climate change and the endless development of human civilization. This 
research confirms the fact that problems of water quantity, quality, and equitable access will only 
grow more urgent as time passes and climate change further alters our physical world. In the case 
of the Indus river system, these waters play a large role in the still-hostile relationship between 
India and Pakistan that threatens South Asia with nuclear annihilation. Continued study of the 
water security environment along the Indus system is clearly warranted given the risks involved. 
 Shared rivers also pose a unique challenge to the long-held principle of territorial 
sovereignty. The political borders of human society do not align neatly with the physical 
locations of these water resources, and constantly attempting to bend nature to fit the lines on our 
maps is an exercise as arrogant as it is futile. With climate change looming over the rest of the 
21st century and beyond, perhaps the time has come to fundamentally redefine the concept of 
sovereignty in a way that reflects the realities of the physical environment upon which we 
depend for our continued existence. The continued existence of human civilization relies on 
water, as does the pursuit of stability and prosperity. The more we do to understand the 
relationship between freshwater resources and security across the globe, the better off humanity 
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 Using the “Descriptor Fields x Code Count” display tool in Dedoose, the following data 
indicates the frequency with which a certain level of state authority is employed to communicate 
water policy. Figures 1 and 2 below refer to Key Finding #1 on pages 21-22. 
 
Figure 1 – India 
 
Source: Dedoose  
  
 The top row within the black rectangle represents authority figures of the advisor level or 
lower, whereas the bottom row represents authority figures at the head of state level. In this 
inquiry, “head of state” level of authority also includes Ministry/Cabinet-level officials. For 
example, the highest level of state authority was used to address the following: 
 
1. Total number of times India utilized a “head of state” authority figure: 84 codes 
2. Inputs contributing to climate change: 36 codes 
3. Ideas and/or policies representing the “Commodity” school of thought: 40 codes 
4. Ideas and/or policies representing the “Human Right” school of thought: 38 codes 
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 Figure 2 displays the same data fields as Figure 1, linked to Pakistan’s policy documents 
instead of India’s. Again, this is the “Descriptor Fields x Code Count” display tool in Dedoose, 
used to indicate the frequency with which a certain level of state authority is employed to 
communicate water policy. Figures 1 and 2 refer to Key Finding #1 on pages 21-22. 
Unfortunately, these counts are much lower than they should be due to the imbalance in my 
primary data that occurred late in the coding process. Too many of the sources discarded were 











 The Code Presence chart in Dedoose indicates whether a given code was applied or not. 
A ‘1’ means the code is present, whereas a blank square means the code is not present. The blank 
spaces within the black square are instances where primary source documents from India, 
Pakistan, and/or an outside actor touched on ideas of the Commodity or Human Right schools of 
thought and did not mention conflict/competition nor cooperation with the upper/lower riparian 

















 This is another section of the same Code Occurrence chart represented in Figure 3, where 
a ‘1’ means that a code is present, and a blank square means that a code is not present. The black 
rectangle illustrates where primary documents from India, Pakistan, and/or an outside actor 
addressed Indus river policy that did not include any mention of conflict/competition nor 
cooperation with the upper or lower riparian state (India → Pakistan or Pakistan → India). 


















 This is another section of the same Code Occurrence chart represented in Figure 3, where 
a ‘1’ means that a code is present, and a blank square means that a code is not present. The black 
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square illustrates where primary documents from India, Pakistan, and/or an outside stakeholder 
addressed India or Pakistan’s responses to perceived water stress in bilateral or multilateral 
forums and did not include any mention of the upper/lower riparian (India → Pakistan or 





 This appendix contains the code tree I created in Dedoose to apply in the analysis of my 
primary data sample. The numbers beside each code are the total number of applications for 
each, inclusive of all child code counts. 
 
                Figure 7        Figure 8 
      India Code Tree – Part 1       India Code Tree (continued) 











         Figure 9  
End of India Code Tree/Start of                 Figure 10 
 Pakistan Code Tree          Pakistan Code Tree (continued) 
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